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Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union 
Revisited 
Output, Input and Throughput
Vivien Schmidt
Abstract
Whether their analytic frameworks focus on institutional form and practices or on its interactive 
construction, scholars have analyzed the EU’s democratic legitimacy mainly in terms of the trade-offs 
between the output effectiveness of EU’s policies outcomes for the people and the input participation by 
and representation of the people. Missing is theorization of the “throughput” efficiency, accountability, 
transparency, and openness to consultation with  the people of the EU’s internal governance processes. 
The paper argues that adding this analytic category facilitates assessment of these legitimizing mechanisms’ 
interdependencies and facilitates consideration of reforms that could turn this democratic trilemma into 
a “virtuous circle”.
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1.  Introduction1
Is the European Union democratic? And even if democratic, is it legitimate? The answers to these questions 
divide those who argue that the European Union (EU) has a democratic deficit from those who argue the 
contrary and those who would see the remedy as coming through greater integration and politicization 
from those who recommend the opposite. Underpinning these divisions are different understandings of 
what democracy in the EU is, how it can be legitimated, and whether it can or should be improved. In 
addition to these substantive differences are the ones in terms of analytic frameworks, dividing those who 
define democracy in Europe in terms of its institutional form and practice as a system of “governance” and 
those who focus on its interactive construction by a demos in the “European public sphere”. 
Whatever their differences in substantive theory and analytic framework, however, scholars have tended 
to summarize their main arguments in concepts borrowed from systems theory, as they analyze the 
trade-offs between output legitimacy, judged in terms of the effectiveness of the EU’s policy outcomes 
for the people, and input legitimacy, judged in terms of the EU’s responsiveness to citizen concerns as a 
result of participation by and representativeness of the people. Missing, this paper will argue, is sufficient 
theorization of what we call throughput legitimacy, building upon yet another term from systems theory, 
judged in terms of the accountability, transparency and efficiency of the EU’s decision-making processes 
along with their openness to pluralist consultation with the people. With this added analytic category, we 
are better able to assess the interdependencies of the different legitimizing mechanisms and to see that 
increasing any one, two or all three need not solely be to the detriment of the others, but could instead 
be mutually reinforcing. In other words, rather than a democratic trilemma making for a zero-sum game, 
they could instead constitute a “virtuous circle” with a “win-win” solution for democracy and legitimacy 
in Europe.
This paper begins with a theoretical discussion of the three democratic legitimizing mechanisms: output 
for the people, input by and of the people, and, throughput with the people. It then considers democracy 
and legitimacy within each of these democratic legitimizing mechanisms while distinguishing in each 
section between accounts focused on the institutional forms and practices of the EU. In the first set of 
accounts, the framework for analysis is mainly historical and rational choice institutionalist, as scholars 
explore the historical logics of path dependent institutions and the rationalist logics of calculation in the 
EU’s institutions (see Scharpf 1997, 1999; Pierson 1996; Bulmer 1998, 2009). In the second set, concerned 
with the interactive construction of democracy and legitimacy, the framework for analysis is mainly 
sociological and discursive institutionalist, as scholars explore the sociological logics of appropriateness 
and the discursive logics of communication in the EU’s deliberative public sphere (see Diez 1999; Parsons 
2003; Jabko 2006; Schmidt 2006: Chapter 5, 2008). The conclusion considers how one could turn the 
“vicious circle” of the democratic trilemma into a virtuous one, by pointing to possible reform initiatives 
for the EU.
1 This paper has benefited greatly from comments by Tanja Börzel, Thomas Risse, and other participants in the 
jour fixe of the Research College on the Transformative Power of Europe, Freie Universität, by Michael Zürn and 
members of the WZB seminar, Susanne Schmidt, Ulrike Liebert, and other members of the Bremen seminar, as 
well as by Fritz Scharpf, Simon Bulmer, Sandra Kröger, Jean-Claude Piris, Amandine Crespy, Marianne Van de 
Steeg, Jean Leca and by the anonymous reviewer.
6 | KFG Working Paper No. 21| November 2010 
2.  EU Legitimizing Mechanisms: Output, Input and Throughput
Debates about general concepts of EU legitimacy have for the most part been focused on mechanisms 
that Scharpf (1999) has delineated in terms of output legitimacy – a performance criterion centering on 
the ability of EU institutions to govern effectively for the people – and input legitimacy – involving political 
participation by and citizen representation of the people. These definitions pick up on Abraham Lincoln’s 
famous dictum about democracy requiring government by the people, of the people and for the people 
at the same time that the terms themselves have been borrowed from systems theories. They originate 
in particular in the work of David Easton (1965), who defined input into the political system as consisting 
of citizens’ demands and support (conferred not only through elections but also by citizen identity and 
sense of system legitimacy) and output as government decisions and actions, leaving what went on in the 
political system itself largely blank. For Scharpf (1999) input legitimacy refers to the participatory quality 
of the process leading to laws and rules, output to the problem-solving quality of the laws and rules, both 
of which he finds necessary. But he concludes that one needs to focus on the problem-solving logics of 
institutional output because the EU lacks the constructive preconditions for input (as support), consisting 
of collective identity and a European demos.
Many EU scholars follow Scharpf’s institutional lead. They generally employ analytic frameworks that can 
be characterized as historical institutionalist because they detail the development of political institutions 
as regularized patterns and routinized practices subject to a “logic of path-dependence” (Pierson 1996; 
Bulmer 1998, 2009) and/or as rational choice institutionalist because they posit “rational” actors who 
pursue their preferences following a “logic of calculation” within political institutions that serve as 
structures of incentives (Scharpf 1997, 1999; Majone 1999; Moravcsik 1998). Other scholars, by contrast, 
debate the presence (or absence) of the EU’s interactive construction, using analytic frameworks that can 
be characterized as sociological institutionalist because they focus on social agents who act according 
to a “logic of appropriateness” within political institutions that are defined as socially constituted and 
culturally framed rules and norms (March/Olsen 1989; Fligstein 2008) and/or discursive institutionalist 
(also social constructivism in International Relations). This analytic framework is more concerned with 
sentient (thinking and speaking) agents who convey ideas through discourse according to an interactive 
“logic of communication” in political institutions that embody meaning-based structures and constructs 
(Habermas 1996, 2001; Risse 2010; Schmidt 2006, 2008; Wodak 2009).
Most of the scholarly literature, in fact, separates these two kinds of analyses, focusing attention either 
on the logics of institutional form and decision-making practices or on the ideational constructions and 
discursive interactions of identity and community.2 But both are necessary to assess the nature, problems 
and potential of EU democratic legitimacy.
For scholars who focus on institutional form and practice, EU output legitimacy has mostly been tied 
to the performance of the policy decisions of its “non-majoritarian” forms of institutions (e.g. Majone 
2 It should be noted that all of the scholars in these fields acknowledge the significance of both institutional logic 
and interactive construction. It is just that they treat one or the other as residual. Most scholars who focus on 
interactive construction see it as embedded within given institutional contexts while most concerned with ins-
titutional form and practice see it as contingent to some extent on interactive construction. What differentiates 
these scholars most, therefore, is what they choose to examine in depth, and how they choose to theorize this.
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1998) such as the European Central Bank (ECB), the European Commission’s Competition Authority, 
the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and other regulatory bodies; to the policy outcomes of the EU’s 
multiple veto structures taken as a whole (e.g. Moravcsik 2002); as well as to the community enhancing 
performance of the policies themselves (e.g. Menon/Weatherill 2008; Caporaso/Tarrow 2008). For 
scholars who concentrate on interactive construction, in contrast, output legitimacy depends not just on 
policy performance but on how such EU policies resonate with citizen values and build identity, mediated 
by how well elites’ discourse serves to legitimate those policies and how citizens respond in the context of 
media-carried “communicative discourses” of deliberation or even contestation (Koopmans 2004; Eder/
Trenz 2007; Risse 2010). Such discourses may be focused on internal EU economic and social policies (e.g. 
Dyson 2002; Barbier 2008), on the EU’s external role as a global actor (e.g. Manners 2002; Howorth 2010) 
or on “grand narratives” of the origins and purpose of the EU as a whole (e.g. Leca 2010).
With regard to input, scholars of institutional form and practice situate legitimization in the EU’s 
“majoritarian” representative practices involving citizens’ articulation of their demands through electoral 
participation as well as in other ways (e.g. interest group membership, grassroot campaigns, demonstrations) 
and the representation of those demands at the EU level by the Council and the European Parliament 
(EP) (e.g. Mair 2006; Hix 2008) although some scholars add representation through EU-active civil society 
organizations (e.g. Kohler-Koch 2010). Scholars of interactive construction in contrast are more concerned 
with the legitimacy built again through the “communicative” discourse of public deliberation, contestation 
and legitimization (Schmidt 2005, 2006), which follows from the communicative processes involved in 
elections and other forms of deliberative interactions with the public and civil society, and how these may 
contribute to the construction of a sense of collective identity and/or the formation of a collective political 
will in a European “public sphere” (e.g. Zürn 2000; Habermas 2001; Steffek 2003; Lucarelli et al. 2011). 
Responses to output policies, moreover, also feed into both input institutional practices and constructive 
interactions as feedback effects.
Missing from this theorization, however, is a general theory about the practices that constitute what I 
will call, borrowing again from systems theory, throughput legitimacy (but expanding on Easton’s concept, 
which is limited to bureaucratic practice). This conceptualization of throughput legitimacy is intended to 
encompass not only the internal processes and practices of EU governance but also what I have termed, 
adding a preposition to Abraham Lincoln’s phrase, interest consultation with the people (Schmidt 2006). 
Throughput legitimacy is a performance criterion centering on what goes on inside the “black box” of 
the political system, between the input and the output. Legitimacy here is focused on the quality of the 
processes of EU governance, which means not just their efficiency but also, and most importantly, their 
accountability, meaning that policy actors are responsive and can be held responsible for output decisions 
(Bovens 2007; Curtin/Wille 2008; Harlow/Rawlins 2007); transparency, meaning that citizens have access 
to information (Héritier 2003); and openness to “civil society”, meaning that citizens organized in interest-
based organizations have access to and influence in the decision-making process.
Curiously enough, there has been little theorization about the throughput legitimacy of EU governance 
processes taken as a whole, despite the fact that there is a vast literature focused on the legitimacy of 
individual aspects of such processes within the Commission, the Council and the EP as well as within civil 
society. The only exception has been a cluster of scholars mainly in Germany and bordering countries (see, 
e.g. Zürn 2000; Benz/Papadopoulos 2006; Dingwerth 2007; Holzhacker 2007; Risse/Kleine 2007; Bekkers/
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Edwards 2007; Wimmel 2009) who have for the most part defined throughput as a question of procedural 
legitimacy involving the quality of decision-making, and who have examined this more widely in terms of 
governance beyond the state (e.g. Zürn 1998) and private governance (e.g. Dingwerth 2007). Most leave 
out explicit discussion of interest group participation (e.g. Risse/Kleine 2007; but see Bekkers/Edwards 
2007), or include it as part of input to representative institutions. But interest input – involving the ways 
in which civil society articulates its demands through interest groups, protest, demonstrations, letter-
writing campaigns, social movement activism and the like – does not capture the ways in which interest 
articulation has become an integral part of the very throughput process of EU governance (see Smismans 
2003; Kohler-Koch 2008; Kroger 2008; Liebert/Trenz 2009).
In terms of institutional form and practice, throughput denotes the procedural legitimacy with which the 
EU produces policies that begin with the Commission-generated formulation of legislation with the people 
through access to “minority” interests from “civil society” as well as to state actors; that then continue 
through the various co-decision-making processes that garner input by and of the people via the Council 
and EP as well as further interest intermediation with the people; and that end in the decisions that deliver 
output for the people. This entire process is often summed up as the “Community Method”, although 
it could also be termed “pluralist” policymaking (Coen/Richardson 2009). But it encompasses a much 
wider range of decision-making processes than the community method stricto sensu connotes, including 
the “open method of coordination” and other “new governance” modes in the social, employment and 
monetary policy arenas, comitology, supranational coordination in the justice and policing domains and 
more.
Institutional throughput, however, could be defined more fully by taking into account EU processes within 
the whole of the EU’s highly compound governance system (Schmidt 2004, 2006; Fabbrini 2007) which is 
not only multi-level by including EU, national and regional levels (Marks/Hooghe 2001) and “multi-centred” 
as a result of the geographical dispersion of its governing activities (Nicolaïdes 2001) but also “multi-form” 
along a continuum from “simple” polities where governing activity tends to be channelled through a single 
authority, as in France or the United Kingdom, to more “compound” polities where governing activity is 
more dispersed across multiple authorities, as in Germany and Italy (Schmidt 2006). Such differences 
can make for additional legitimacy problems as a result of a lack of institutional “fit” between the highly 
compound EU, in which legitimacy is focused on the multiple authorities of the system as a whole, and 
simple national polities, in which legitimacy is concentrated on the executive (Schmidt 2006). But there 
are also more specific problems of multi-level legitimacy involving horizontal and vertical processes of 
integration (Benz 2006).
In terms of interactive construction, throughput legitimacy focuses on the ideational constructions and 
deliberative processes that promote accountability, transparency and access to civil society. As such, 
constructive throughput is focused more on the quality of the relationship among actors than on the 
quality of the social and political rules, which is the focus of institutional throughput (see Risse/Kleine 
2007).  These interactive relationships can be found primarily in the “coordinative” sphere of policy 
construction (see Schmidt 2006), such as in the deliberations of experts (e.g. Joerges/Neyer 1997), in 
the debates of the European Parliament (Eriksen/Fossum 2002; Wodak 2009) and their interactions with 
the Council and the Commission, in the involvement of organized interest groups with EU institutions 
(Smismans 2003; Kröger 2008; Liebert/Trenz 2009) or social movements (Della Porta 2005), as well as how 
                                 Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited    | 9
ad hoc deliberative moments like the Constitutional Convention can bring EU elites, civil society and social 
movements into a deliberative democratic process (e.g. Risse/Kleine 2007). Equally important, however, 
constructive throughput can also spill over into the output processes of public deliberation, contestation 
and legitimization in the “communicative” sphere – as elites involved in EU decision-making communicate 
about these to national publics as well as engage with opinion-makers, the media and citizens in an 
effort to demonstrate their accountability, to increase their transparency, as well as to legitimate their 
performance. And this output may in its turn produce feedback in the form of citizen input processes, 
especially once referenda are on the agenda.
At what point throughput becomes output or input within the context of constructive interaction can 
appear a bit fuzzy, then. This is also the case for institutional form and practice, in particular with regard 
to determining whether civil society groups’ articulation of interests constitutes throughput, when 
such groups are directly involved in EU decision-making processes; input, when they represent their 
constituencies’ concerns directly to EU institutions and/or those concerns are articulated by political 
representatives; or even output, if their recommendations become policy.
Generally speaking, however, these three legitimizing mechanisms are readily differentiable. Output 
legitimacy requires policies that work effectively while resonating with citizens’ democratic ideals, values 
and identity. Input legitimacy depends on citizens expressing demands institutionally and deliberatively 
through representative politics while providing constructive support via their sense of identity and 
community. And throughput legitimacy needs processes that work efficiently and inclusively while 
promoting constructive interaction (see Figure 1). But although differentiable, these mechanisms are 
nonetheless interdependent in the sense that increasing or decreasing any one, whether output, input or 
throughput, has effects on the workings of the other two – for better or for worse.
Complicating matters for the EU is the fact that this interdependence affects both the EU taken as 
a whole and its member states qua national democracies. But while EU member states have all three 
such mechanisms, in the EU these mechanisms are largely split between the EU and national levels of 
governance. At the EU level, output governing effectiveness for the people and throughput interest 
consultation with the people are the primary legitimizing mechanisms while input legitimacy comes 
largely from the national level, where political participation by the people and citizen representation of 
the people tend to be situated (see Schmidt 2004, 2006: 21-29). This creates a dynamic in which EU 
level output policies and throughput processes alter the equilibria of national legitimizing mechanisms, by 
putting pressure on national level input politics while diminishing the importance of national throughput 
processes and the amount of purely national output policies. This can generate legitimacy problems for 
EU member states generally, and in turn for the EU itself. But given this, how then do we establish the EU’s 
legitimacy, whatever the legitimizing mechanisms, whichever the analytic framework?
My general definition of legitimacy here, building on Max Weber, relates to the extent to which institutional 
and interactive input politics, throughput processes and output policies are acceptable to and accepted by 
the citizenry, such that citizens believe that these are morally authoritative and they therefore voluntarily 
comply with government acts even when these go against their own interests and desires. Determining 
what citizens accept or find acceptable is another matter, however, and depends on legitimizing arguments 
based in the culture, history and values that contribute to citizens’ ideas about the nature, purposes 
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and appropriate outcomes of governing. And this can be very varied indeed, given differences among 
EU member states on their conceptions of national democracy and their visions of the EU.3 Substantive 
legitimacy in the EU as a result allows for no universal generalizations, given that it involves multiple 
levels of institutional practices and constructive interactions in input politics, throughput processes and 
output policies that are interlinked in such a way that changes in any one affect all the others. In what 
follows, therefore, I seek mainly to sketch out the broad patterns and major problems involved in the 
legitimization of the EU. I begin with output because EU legitimacy was all about output, way before EU 
officials and scholars became concerned about input, let alone throughput.
Figure 1: A System Theory of the EU: Input, Output and “Throughput” 
 
(Dark arrows = direct effects; transparent arrows = less direct effects)
3 Thanks to Fritz Scharpf and the Bremen colloquium participants for suggesting this line of reasoning (11 May 
2010).
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3.  Output Legitimacy
While a few scholars argue that the EU already benefits from output legitimacy in terms of its institutional 
form and practice, in particular with regard to its “non-majoritarian” institutions, the large majority 
of scholars of the European Union have tended to argue that the EU suffers from a democratic deficit. 
Scholars who focus on constructive interaction add that output legitimacy problems for EU policies stem 
not just from their non-majoritarian sources but also from their potential lack of resonance with national 
ideals and values, made worse by the fact that EU elites have done little in recent years to produce the 
narratives and discourses that would serve to legitimize most of its policies or to build identity.
 3.1  Institutional Regulatory Output
Only a few scholars defend the EU as democratic enough already and they generally tend to base their 
defense on the output legitimacy of non-majoritarian institutions in form and/or in practice. Majone 
(1996, 1998) argues that as a “regulatory state” the EU’s output legitimacy is based on the delegated 
responsibility of its “expertocracy” to produce effective policies and decisions for the people. Moravcsik 
(2002), who characterizes the EU as more of an intergovernmental organization than a regulatory state, 
maintains that the EU’s institutional checks and balances along with its delegated authorities ensure that 
the EU is no worse than other democracies in terms of the output legitimacy of its decisions. Menon and 
Weatherill (2008) argue that the EU’s institutional practices ensure output legitimacy, based on the EU’s 
ability to serve an “efficiency promoting function” by doing things for the member states that they cannot 
do on their own such as creating the internal market, speaking for the member states in international 
trade negotiations and acting through the European Central Bank (ECB) to coordinate responses to the 
economic meltdown. Caporaso and Tarrow have additionally contended that output comes out of what 
Polanyi (2001) in “The Great Transformation” argued was the constant process of social re-equilibration 
of economic liberalization through the simultaneous movement/counter movement of disembedding and 
re-embedding markets in society with EU market-correcting alongside EU market-making. This can be 
seen in European Court of Justice (ECJ) rulings in such areas as gender equality (Cichowski 2004), regional 
equality, environmental protection and laws promoting family solidarity in the case of labor mobility.
Although these views of the EU’s output legitimacy make important points about the ways in which EU 
institutional forms and practices have ensured a certain kind of non-majoritarian legitimacy, they make 
three questionable assumptions. Grounding output legitimacy primarily in institutional form or practice, 
whether through the EU’s regulatory functions or its structural checks and balances, seems to assume that 
output is necessarily good simply because it is produced by independent regulators that its output cannot 
be bad simply because it has multiple vetoes; and that its policies intrinsically serve the general interest. 
Majone (2009) himself now questions this assumption.4
First, the problem with assuming that output is necessarily good because produced by independent 
regulators fails to deal with the difference between non-majoritarian institutions at the EU and national 
4 Note that Majone’s (2009) now argues that the EU as a regulatory state has lost legitimacy because its regulato-
ry agencies have overstepped their remit. But this does not do much to counter the initial formulation that the 
regulatory state by its very nature, as opposed to its performance, assures output legitimacy in the EU.
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levels. At the national level, the decisions of non-majoritarian institutions are accepted as legitimate 
because they operate in the “shadow of politics”, as the product of political institutions, with political 
actors who have the capacity not only to create them but also to alter them and their decisions if they 
so choose. They are balanced by institutional input legitimacy. At the EU level, there is no such political 
balancing, given the EU’s decision rules that make it almost impossible to alter such decisions, let alone 
to alter the non-majoritarian institutions that produce those decisions, in the absence of any kind of 
political government that could force the issue – as in the United States in the case of Franklin Delano 
Roosevelt’s threat to pack the Supreme Court if it did not stop ruling his decisions unconstitutional. ECJ 
rulings, for example, are not only not reversible by individual member states because of the “habit of 
the law” (Maduro 1998: 11), in which national courts enforce and reinforce ECJ decisions, but also by 
the member states collectively, which would need unanimously voted Treaty amendments to overturn 
decisions based on primary European law, Commission initiative plus qualified majorities in the Council 
and absolute majorities in the EP for interpretations of secondary law (Scharpf 2010).
Second, as to the output benefits of the EU’s multiple-veto institutional structures, Scharpf (1988) has 
also convincingly argued that the “joint decision trap” of the EU’s quasi-federal structure is even worse 
than that of Germany, raising questions about its output effectiveness or its output tout court, while the 
rationalist logic of its multiple veto structure often produces sub-optimal substantive policy outcomes 
(Scharpf 1999). What is more, a structural logic that sees checks and balances as in themselves democratic 
and legitimate is also problematic because it takes as a fundamental premise the thwarting of majoritarian 
expressions of the popular will. This federal way of structuring democracy and establishing legitimacy may 
work for the US, born in a particular historical context in reaction against a unitary governmental power 
(Mény 2010), as well as for Germany, constructed in reaction against the Nazi behemoth with the help 
of the American occupation authority. But the US and Germany, as compound polities, are at opposite 
ends of the spectrum as compared to democracies such as France or the UK, simple polities in which 
the concentration of executive power in unitary governing structures in order to carry out the will of the 
people – whether as “l’État républicain” or “Crown in Parliament” – is regarded as most legitimate and 
democratic (Schmidt 2006).
Third, with regard to the blanket assumption that the EU’s non-majoritarian output policies are legitimate 
because in the general interest an increasing number of contested decisions by the EU Commission and 
the ECJ throw this too into question. These decisions include the Commission’s services initiative that 
privileged home country rules, including pensions and wage rates for service workers in host countries, 
and the ECJ decisions focusing on freedom of movement that curtailed national unions’ rights to strike in 
the Laval and Viking cases or struck down Austrian medical schools’ quotas on German medical students. 
Although these could be seen positively from a EU level perspective as promoting a Polanyian, market-
correcting governance for all Europeans, it can just as readily be seen negatively from a national level 
perspective as a neo-liberal post-Polanyian destruction of national labor relations and welfare systems 
(Höpner/Schäfer, 2007; see also Scharpf 2010). Additionally, because of the differences among member 
states, it is likely that the more the EU Commission and ECJ push an integrating agenda into areas that 
touch on deeply held values, the more the EU’s output legitimacy is likely to become contested – in 
particular because the decision rules are such that any individual member-state or groups of states are 
unlikely to be able to stop such decisions.
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These examples illustrate a fourth drawback to output, which takes us to the interactive construction of 
legitimacy. As Cerutti has argued, the performance-based legitimacy of the output variety is insufficient 
for legitimization, since outcomes also require a kind of “Weberian legitimacy”, by which he means the 
substantive values and principles guiding the performance, that make the performance valued (2008). 
In other words, even if policy performance is optimal, if the actual content of the policies clashes with 
national values and principles, as reflected in European citizens’ perceptions of EU policies as acceptable 
and appropriate (or not), then its output legitimacy is in question.
3.2  Constructive Discursive Output 
Output legitimacy does not depend on the policy performance of EU institutions alone, but must be 
considered in terms of how its policies resonate with citizens’ substantive values (read also identity) as 
well as fit with their interests. This need not be a passive exercise. Political elites generally actively seek to 
legitimate policies through normative arguments that appeal to values, as well as to justify them through 
cognitive arguments that show how the community can gain from them. This at least is the theory. In 
practice, European elites engage in much less discursive re-conceptualization of interests or promotion 
of substantive values than one might expect or is necessary for the constructive output legitimacy of EU 
policies. Moreover, national publics engage in much less discussion, deliberation and contestation about 
EU policy performance than one might expect, given the phenomenal amount of EU legislation affecting 
national policies and policymaking.
Output policy legitimization for the most part occurs in the communicative discourse of the political sphere. 
This may be top-down, as political elites engage in legitimating discourses about the EU and its policies, or 
bottom-up, as EU-related policies and discourses generate responses and debate from the national media 
and opinion leaders along with the general public. Such communicative discourses can be centered on 
internal policies, in efforts to highlight the institutional output performance of, say, the single currency 
(Dyson 2002), the internal market, and environmental policies or to foster positive attitudes toward certain 
kinds of EU norms and values, such as Commission campaigns to promote gender equality, oppose racism 
or build the concept of a “social Europe” to counter perceptions of an EU neo-liberal policy focus (Barbier 
2008). Alternatively, they may be concerned with external policies, say, by promoting human rights among 
its trading partners, casting the EU as a “normative power” in its “neighborhood” as well as in the world 
more generally (Manners 2002; Laïdi 2008).
In the course of generating discussion, deliberation and even contestation about EU policies, the 
communicative discourse may also perform an identity-building function, since the sense of being European 
is generally built not just on doing, as in institutional policy outputs, but also on saying what the EU is 
doing, which makes for constructive interactive outputs (Schmidt 2006: Chapter. 1; 2009b). The problem 
here is that national politicians in recent years have tended to engage in comparatively little saying about 
what the EU is doing. Instead, when national politicians do speak on the EU, they have tended to engage 
mainly in blame-shifting on unpopular policies, claiming that “the EU made me do it”, or credit-taking on 
popular policies, often without even letting on that the policy was generated in Brussels (Schmidt 2006). 
Studies of media discourse and debate about the EU in the 1990s and early 2000s show that, with the 
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exception of the big events like monetary policy in the run-up to European Monetary Union, enlargement 
in the run-up to 2004, or debates on the Constitutional Treaty, there has been relatively little increase in 
attention to EU policies over time, whether on pensions, education, troop deployment or immigration 
(Koopmans 2004). They also suggest that attention which has been there, might be more of an elite than 
a mass public phenomenon, given that studies of quality newspapers show significant Europeanization 
in a number of spheres, but not the tabloids or television (Risse 2010: 128-133). Nonetheless, scholars 
have demonstrated that there has been a developing transnational “community of communication” 
creating a European public sphere in which national publics by means of the media increasingly debate 
the same issues at the same time using the same frames of reference, and that this has also promoted the 
Europeanization of national identities (Risse 2010; Trenz/Eder 2004).
EU-related identity has been and still is being built, albeit very slowly (see Hermann et al. 2004; Hooghe/
Marks 2005). Exclusive EU identity remains at a very low albeit increasing level, and encompasses mainly 
well-educated, well-traveled, European elites (Fligstein 2008). This said, a majority of citizens do express 
some sort of secondary EU identity, although these numbers have not increased markedly over time. More 
significantly, however, is the fact that identification with Europe varies tremendously among member 
states, with the UK at the lowest end, Italy, France, Spain and Germany at the highest end (Schmidt 2006; 
Risse 2010). And even more importantly, within countries, there are further internal divisions between 
pro and anti European elites and citizens which has significant effects on institutional input legitimacy, 
discussed below.
Why has a sense of identity not increased more significantly over time? Beyond the problems related to 
the poverty of the policy discourse and national political divisions is the fact that the EU has in recent 
years lacked any kind of common, legitimizing “grand narrative” about what the EU is, what it has done, 
and what it should do in the world. A major problem is that the founding, legitimating “grand narrative” of 
European integration, that the EU is all about “peace and prosperity” – which helped persuade national 
publics as to the benefits and legitimacy of the EU – no longer works, given that peace appears assured 
while prosperity is in question. And there are no persuasive new grand narratives either about what the 
EU is or does, as Jean Leca (n/a) has convincingly argued, whether those focused on the EU as “empire”, 
neo-medieval (Zielonka 2006) or cosmopolitan (Beck/Grande 2007), or as a new form of international 
organization, such as my own notion of the “regional state” (Schmidt 2006, 2009a).
Instead, each of the member states could be said to have its very own (often not very grand) narrative 
about the EU (Nicolaïdis/Lacroix 2010). How this plays itself out at the national level depends in large 
measure on the extent to which national political elites have been unified in supporting European 
integration and in creating a narrative that includes Europe as part of national identity, as in Germany 
and Spain; divided in their support and their narratives embedding the EU in national identity, making for 
France’s uneasy consensus and for Poland’s profound disagreements; or divided in their support and with 
national narratives that do not include Europe in national identity, making for the views of Britain among 
other Euroskeptic countries (Risse 2010; see also Schmidt 2009b).
The member states have very different visions not only of national identity in Europe but also of EU identity, 
that is, what it should be and do internally and externally. Here, we can identify four basic, non-mutually-
exclusive legitimating discourses about the EU that national elites have articulated (see Schmidt 2009b; 
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following Eriksen/Fossum 2004 and Sjursen 2007 for the first three kinds of discourse, Howorth 2007 
for the fourth). The first is the pragmatic discourse about the EU as a borderless problem-solving entity 
ensuring free markets and regional security, which is generally characteristic of the UK and Scandinavian 
countries and which provides the thinnest of identities based on trading together or securing the European 
space, and leaving the borders amorphous, open and undefined. The second is the normative discourse 
about the EU as a bordered values-based community, most identified with France and Germany, which 
is also most likely to build the thickest of identities, since it most closely approximates the kind found in 
nation-states based on common values, solidarity and clear borders. The third is a principled discourse 
about the EU as a border-free, rights-based post-national union, attributable to the Commission and to 
philosophers like Habermas (2001) and Beck and Grande (2007), which establishes a rather thin identity 
given the lack of borders or values-based “we-feeling”, notwithstanding Habermas’ (2001) suggestion that 
“constitutional patriotism” could be the basis for a common European identity. And the fourth is a strategic 
discourse about the EU as global actor “doing international relations differently” through multilateralism, 
humanitarian aid and peace keeping which has increasingly become the preferred one of member-state 
leaders generally in their efforts to respond to global challenges such as economic crisis, climate change, 
poverty and terrorism.
This fourth, strategic discourse arguably provides the basis for a thicker identity than the principled 
discourse, because it adds doing to the universalist being, by putting troops on the ground to guarantee 
human rights. But putting troops on the ground often demands a greater sense of values-based community 
solidarity. Without this, the first body-bags coming home could raise questions in member states not only 
about “why we fight” but also about why we are doing this as part of the EU in the first place, unless it were 
accompanied by a sufficiently persuasive legitimating discourse focused on building a strong “member-
state in Europe” identity. This may help explain why, so far, most European Security and Defense Policy 
(ESDP) missions also go out under the flag of the United Nations (UN).
No one legitimizing discourse, in short, is entirely independent of the others. With regard to the fourth 
discourse, for example, even where there is agreement on what to do strategically, this can always be 
undermined by disagreements on what the EU legitimately is – whether a widening free market, deepening 
values-based community or democratizing rights-based union. Moreover, no amount of discourse can 
serve to legitimate the EU if words are not followed by actions, that is, by institutional output. After 
all, with regard to the principled discourse, what does “normative power” Europe really mean if the EU 
cannot deliver, as with the Copenhagen Summit on Climate Change or the slowdown in its progress on 
developing European Security and Defense Policy (Howorth 2010). In addition, on the pragmatic discourse 
of the EU as free market, how much longer will this be seen as legitimate if inequalities rise massively, 
giving the lie to “Social Europe”, especially in light of the decision to send Central and Eastern European 
countries to the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in 2008 and Greece in 2010 to a IMF-EU bailout that 
will mean economic recession for these countries for years to come. This said, the decision to create a 
financial loan guarantee instrument to protect EU member states from default was a major step forward 
with regard to economic solidarity. But to make the EU truly live up to the rhetoric, as well as to build 
greater EU identity and community, it would need much more imagination as well as leadership across 
domains, say, internally, by creating a European Monetary Fund and a European solidarity tax to alleviate 
poverty (see Schmidt 2009a), or externally, by promoting a “global grand bargain” in world security (see 
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Howorth 2010). But however much these kinds of actions might help increase output legitimacy, they 
remain no substitute for increasing input legitimacy.
4.  Input Legitimacy
Input, defined by scholars focused on institutional form and practice, is mostly about the quality of the 
EU’s representative bodies and electoral processes, and how this serves to ensure EU legitimacy. Defined 
by scholars focused on interactive construction, it is also all about the quality of the ideas, discourses, 
political deliberations and contestations that may go on in such institutional settings that may help build 
citizens’ sense of EU legitimacy. And for both of these, there are problematic elements.
4.1  Institutional Representative Input
When it comes to the EU’s institutional input legitimacy, although the European Parliament does provide 
for direct citizen representation, it does not make the grade as input legitimacy by and of the people, in 
particular with regard to the nature and (low) degree of political participation. Arguably most problematic 
from the vantage point of traditional (read national) understandings of input legitimacy here is the absence 
of a government that citizens could vote in or out, which makes it impossible for “the people” to express 
their approval or disapproval of EU policies directly. This helps explain why citizens voting in referenda 
on the Constitutional and Lisbon Treaties largely chose to make clear their views on EU policies and their 
impact on national policies, identity or sovereignty, despite the fact that they were asked to vote on EU 
institutional reform. 
Another problem is that the EU has lacked the kind of politics to which citizens are most likely to relate, 
since EU decision-making has not really been much about politics in the traditional sense of party and 
partisanship (although this has been growing). Instead, it is mostly about the politics of interests, whether 
the politics of the national interest in the Council, the public interest in the European Parliament or of 
organized interests in the Commission. Moreover, at the EU level, party differences and left-right political 
contestation have long been submerged by the general quest for consensus and compromise – even 
though politicization has been growing in Council and EP votes while appointments to EU leadership 
positions (i.e. Commission President, Council President, and High Representative) now take politics into 
account. The co-decision procedures with the Council, voted mostly by super-majorities in the EP, also 
have the effect of submerging partisan divides, as does the Commission’s consensus oriented, technical 
approach to policy initiation and development, which deliberately seeks to avoid left-right divides as it 
attempts to balance the representation of all interests. In addition, European political parties remain 
weak, underdeveloped and not very cohesive, with an amalgam in the EP of different national parties with 
divergent agendas and ideologies in any given European party grouping (Ladrech 2002, 2010; Klingemann 
2005; Mair 2006). Finally, European Parliament elections suffer from high rates of abstention, as in the 
2009 EP parliamentary elections, in which a sizeable number of extreme right parties were elected by the 
lowest turnout ever in such elections (43 per cent).
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All of this makes for what I have called the “policy without politics” of EU policy making (Schmidt 2006, 
2009a), which in turn makes for national “politics without policy” as increasing numbers of policies are 
transferred from the national political arena to the EU, leaving national citizens with little direct input 
on the EU-related policies that affect them, and only national politicians to hold to account for them 
(Schmidt 2006). This has already had a variety of destabilizing effects on national politics, including citizen 
demobilization on the one hand or radicalization on the other (Mair 2006; van der Eijk/Franklin 2004; 
Schmidt 2006).
At the EU level, moreover, all of these issues have led to a decline in the kind of diffuse support that Easton 
identified as a key factor in input legitimacy. This is because the “permissive consensus” of the early years, 
in which citizens largely ignored the EU and its outcomes, has been replaced by a “constraining dissensus” 
along with a rise in Euroskepticism (Hooghe/Marks 2009). What makes matters worse is that new cleavages 
have developed between citizens whose ideas for Europe are more open, liberal and cosmopolitan in 
orientation and those whose ideas are more closed, xenophobic and nationalist or even EU-regionalist 
oriented (Kriesi et al. 2008). The result has been that national electorates have typically been less mobilized 
along left/right party lines on EU-related issues than in terms of identity politics, especially on the right 
(Marks/Hooghe 2009). And with the gradual awakening of the “sleeping giant” of cross-cutting cleavages 
between pro-European “cosmopolitans” and Euroskeptic “nationalists” in mainstream parties of the right 
and the left, the EU is likely to see much more hotly contested, politicized EP elections than in the past, 
even if they remain second-order elections (van der Eijk/Franklin 2004; Franklin/van der Eijk 2007; Kriesi 
et al. 2008; Hooghe/Marks 2009). 
So is the answer to bring in more “policy with politics” at the EU level, as many scholars advocate, in the 
effort to diminish the EU’s input “democratic deficit” (e.g., Magnette 2003; Hix, 2008)? Some have resisted 
this suggestion because they see politicization as deleterious to the EU’s output governing effectiveness 
for the people, by introducing yet another source of division into deliberations already burdened by 
considerations of national, public and special interests among 27 or more member states (Majone 1998; 
Scharpf 2003, 2007; Schmidt 2006:270). And more politics in such complex institutional structures could 
also lead to stalemates that would only increase citizens’ disaffection from and dissatisfaction with the 
EU – thus further undermining diffuse input support. Yet others worry that it is too soon for any such 
politicization given legitimacy problems related to the lack of citizen identity, collective will and a fully 
developed public sphere – which speaks to the interactive construction side of EU input legitimacy.
But the cat is already out of the bag, so the question is how to politicize within the context of the current 
institutional set-up. Simon Hix’ (2008) proposal for a greater majoritarian component to the politics of 
the Council and the EP in order to make it possible to have more clearly demarcated policies of the left or 
right, while a step in the right direction, is premature, since EU political parties lack the kind of cohesion 
and EU citizens the kind of collective identity necessary for any kind of majoritarian politics. The EU might 
do better with the kind of proportional representation system of Germany in which, once the right-left 
polarization of elections campaigns is over, compromise and consensus-seeking rule, in particular at times 
of grand coalitions. Beyond this, greater parliamentarization is imperative, for example, by facilitating 
greater EP input at the beginning stages of policy formulation, by more fully connecting the EP to national 
parliaments – now facilitated by the Lisbon Treaty – and by ensuring greater citizen access to the EP.
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Were these kinds of institutional input politics increase, it is conceivable that the problems of institutional 
output decisions could be alleviated. However, this would be the case only if there were also more and 
better constructive input involving substantive political debates tied to politicization.
4.2  Constructive Deliberative Input
Input legitimacy is not limited to the institutional practices involved in EU citizen participation and 
representation since the success of such practices along with the policies they support depends in large 
measure on the political deliberations and contestations that inform them. Political discourses and debates 
about the content, purposes, instruments and objectives of policies, as well as about the nature, goals and 
future of the “polity” are fundamental to democracies and contribute to the building of legitimacy as well 
as identity. For democratic nation-states, such debates usually occur in the context of elections and other 
forms of public engagement in representative processes. In the EU’s highly compound polity, this is more 
problematic, given the institutional limits to citizen participation and the absence of much “policy with 
politics”.
There have been real problems for the EU with regard to its interactive input construction both in terms 
of discursive interactions and ideas – beyond those related to the poverty of the ideas in leaders’ output-
focused narratives and discourse. This has to do with the fact that EU political actors’ “communicative” 
discourse to the general public is very thin. Part of the reason comes not only from the fact that the EU’s 
institutional input governance by and of the people is so underdeveloped, given the absence of a fully 
representative, directly elected EU government. It is equally a result of the paucity of EU political actors 
able to speak directly to a European public in a common language, reported by a European media and 
considered by a European public opinion (Grimm 1997; Weiler 1999). Instead, the communicative discourse 
comes largely by way of national political actors speaking to national publics in national languages reported 
by national media and considered by national opinion. The problems with such fragmentation in discourse 
are admittedly somewhat attenuated if one recognizes that there is indeed a developing European public 
sphere, only one made up of European member state “publics” – rather than some idealized single “public” 
– in which national publics are increasingly aware of European issues and the views of other member-
state publics (Risse 2003, 2010; Koopmans 2004). However, this does not get around the institutional 
input reality that without a Europe-wide representative politics around which debate could be structured, 
European political leaders have little opportunity to speak directly to the issues and European publics have 
little ability to deliberate about them or to state their conclusions directly, through the ballot box.
Worse yet, politicians mainly engage in blame-shifting and credit-taking when dealing with EU-related 
policies, as noted above, while they remain silent on polity issues, that is, on the impact of the EU on 
national democracy and legitimacy, in which the national communicative sphere is impoverished as more 
and more policies are removed to the EU level and dealt with through policy without politics. All of this 
becomes problematic at times of European Parliamentary elections, let alone referenda, as in France 
and the Netherlands on the Constitutional Treaty, and Ireland on the Lisbon Treaty, by which time the 
damage has already been done. In electoral or referenda campaigns it is a bit late to try to reverse negative 
perceptions of EU policies formed over the long-term in constructive output debate with the short-term 
positive arguments about the EU’s output performance – assuming that politicians actually know how 
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to make them, a questionable assumption judging from the “yes” campaigns in the above-mentioned 
countries. Moreover, the blame-shifting itself only increases citizens’ sense of powerlessness in the face 
of supranational forces to which they must adapt and over which they have no control, while the absence 
of discussion about the impact of the EU on national polities has allowed the Euroskeptics of the political 
extremes to exploit citizen concerns, whether about the impact of immigration on national identity and 
sovereignty on the right or of the “neo-liberal” single market on national social rights on the left (Schmidt 
2006: 37-43). This lack of EU-focused discourse also derives from institutional input realities. Politicians 
are reluctant to expend their scarce political resources on the EU, given political incentive structures 
and institutional rewards that push national politicians to tout their national level successes and to turn 
popular EU policies into national ones, since national politicians are elected by national electorates.
This said, where debates have occurred during referenda or major EU initiatives, even where the results 
for the EU’s institutional input are negative and de-legitimizing, the results for constructive input could 
be seen as positive and even re-legitimizing. For example, even the services directive, which – seen 
from an institutional output perspective – in its initial phases as delegitimizing the EU for citizens in 
some member states (esp. France and Germany), could be seen from a constructive input perspective 
as re-legitimizing the EU in the subsequent EP-led deliberations with Commission members, member-
state leaders, and representatives of social movements (Crespy 2010).5 Similarly, the referendum on 
the Constitutional Treaty in France, the negative results of which suggest a blow for institutional input 
legitimacy, can nevertheless be seen positively as contributing to constructive input legitimacy, given the 
highly deliberative and inclusive process of public debate that preceded the vote (Schmidt 2007; WRR 
2007). It is in this sense that democratic theorists have considered referenda more generally as building 
democratic legitimacy, whatever the outcome (Abromeit 1998; Zürn 2000). But a more positive instance 
of legitimacy-building in the EU public sphere could be seen in European political leaders’ response to 
the inclusion of the right-wing extremist party of Jörg Haider in the Conservative governing coalition in 
Austria in 2000, which generated a Europe wide debate focused on issues of anti-discrimination and the 
dangers of anti-democratic governments (Van de Steeg 2006). This in turn led to significant institutional 
output with the production of a EU directive in record time (Geddes/Guiraudon 2004), plus the exclusion 
procedure now enshrined in the Treaty of the European Union.
There are again, however, other even more basic problems for constructive input legitimacy that involve 
differences among member states in foundational ideas about the nature of “legitimate government” as 
well as what the EU’s ultimate purpose should be. These can be conceived in terms of differences in 
the philosophical bases of legitimacy that Scharpf (2009) characterizes as “liberal” – which emphasizes 
the output bases to non-majoritarian or federal institutional structures and the throughput benefits of 
interest intermediation – vs. “republican” – which critiques both throughput and output mechanisms as 
failing to consider the lack of substantive legitimacy based on community values and redistributive goals 
or the absence of significant input legitimacy. Such divisions alternatively can focus on the normative 
ideals – or nightmares – about what EU democracy is or ought to be, such as those identified by Erikson 
and Fossum (2009) in the RECON project as a minimalist “audit democracy” that would be even less than 
5 The fact that this changed legislation has not stopped the Commission from pursuing further initiatives and the 
ECJ from making further rulings that extend services liberalization around the limits established by the Council/
EP approved directive suggests a conflict between representative input legitimacy and performance-based 
output legitimacy (S. Schmidt 2009; Scharpf 2010).
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Euroskeptics would want, a maximalist “federalist multinational democracy” that goes beyond what even 
the most pro-European federalist could expect, and an idealist “cosmopolitan democracy” that appears 
unworkable because devoid of state apparatus or other regional counterparts.
The failures of constructive input legitimacy, thus, result from the primacy of national political ideas 
and discourse and the paucity of ideas and discourse about the EU. This, added to the inadequacies of 
constructive output legitimacy, given the lack of narratives or discursive promotion of EU policies, only 
complicate the legitimization of throughput processes.
5.  Throughput Legitimacy
For scholars concerned with institutional form and practice, throughput legitimacy involves the policymaking 
processes through which decisions go from input to output within the “black box” of EU governance. 
Throughput includes not only the workings of the decision-making processes as a whole – that they 
work efficiently and appropriately in accountable and transparent manner – but also the intermediation 
processes through which citizens qua interests as opposed to qua voters have an influence. For scholars 
more concerned with constructive interaction, throughput refers also to the ideas and deliberative 
interactions involved in who is persuading whom and on what grounds within the EU institutional context. 
And here, in contrast to the EU’s thin communicative discourse to the general public, the “coordinative” 
discourse among EU policy actors engaged in throughput governance with the people is highly elaborate 
(Schmidt 2006).
5.1  Institutional Pluralist Throughput
Throughput legitimacy via interest-based intermediation and consultation with the people, to begin with, 
represents a way in which minority interests can gain a voice even without a majority vote. In the EU, 
such interests include not only well-organized special interests, such as business, but also more diffuse 
difficult-to-organize majority interests such as consumer groups and public interest oriented groups 
such as environmental groups, policy think-tanks or even social movements. This kind of legitimacy has 
been theorized not only by the pluralist political scientists of the 1950s and 1960s in America such as 
David Truman and Robert Dahl to legitimate interest participation in policymaking that was seen as in 
contradiction to citizen representation through the electoral process. Theorists of “associative democracy” 
have also identified interest group access – in this case of public interests – as another form of democracy 
in its own right, as well as a corrective to representative democracy (Cohen/Rogers 1992; Hirst 1994). 
For the EU, throughput governance with the people through pluralist-type consultation – mainly as part 
of the joint decision-making process involving a wide range of governmental and non-governmental 
actors commonly known as the “Community Method” – has deliberately been encouraged as a way of 
counterbalancing the paucity of governance by or of the people through political participation and citizen 
representation. But it is only in recent years that such “functional representation” through interest groups 
has come to be seen as an additional form of democratic legitimization in the EU (see Kohler-Koch 2007; 
Kröger 2008).
Within the EU, the Commission and increasingly the European Parliament have sought to promote more 
                                 Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited    | 21
pluralist consultation with the people, meaning interest groups and members of “civil society”, as a way to 
counterbalance the lack of governance by the people and to promote democratic legitimacy (Greenwood 
2007). The Commission in particular sought to find ways to make policymaking “more inclusive and 
accountable” to “civil society” – defined as including special interests like business and labor along 
with activist citizens – as well as more transparent, as per the EU Commission’s (2001) White Paper on 
European Governance (Kohler-Koch 2007, 2010; Kröger 2008). Accountability was to be improved through 
closer controls on expenditures and appointments and transparency, by providing greater access to EU 
documentation for the media and interest groups (Héritier 2003) as well as through the internet and the 
development of e-government (Hüller 2010) – which often leads to information overload for any individual 
trying to sort through the massive amounts of materials available while navigating through EU websites.
As for access and openness to civil society, the EU Commission sought to create a more balanced and open 
playing field among interests groups, although how effective it has been is open to question (see Kröger 
2008). This has included creating “grassroots” interest groups (e.g. of women and consumers) at the EU 
level to counter-balance the more powerful, already present business groups, with the resulting networks 
in which mutually suspicious actors can ensure more demanding forms of reciprocal accountability 
(Héritier 1999). Moreover, the EU has given voice to a whole range of public interest groups which may 
be marginalized in their national polities and whose common interests are better expressed at the EU 
level, such as in gender equality (Cichowski 2004) and sexual harassment laws (Zippel 2006). Even social 
movements have been able to exercise informal influence (Della Porta 2005, 2009). Take for example the 
case of ATTAC, the French-originated social movement, which exercises this informal influence through its 
contacts with the Commission and the membership of Members of the European Parliament (MEPs), in its 
mobilization against the services directive (Crespy 2010). 
With regard to such interest intermediation, the EU avoids some of the worst problems of US style 
pluralism, in which the politics of money and influence play a major role and partisan considerations 
take precedence over technical ones. This is the upside of the EU’s “policy without politics”. Moreover, 
rather than competition among interests, the EU Commission fosters cooperation in its consensus-based 
policy formulation process, with rules of the game that entail that in order to play, participants must gain 
and maintain credibility as trusted actors providing accurate technical information (Coen 2008; Coen/
Richardson 2009). This has been seen not only in the consultation processes in policy formulation but 
also in the comitology processes of the EU-anointed national experts, government representatives and 
interests. The growing co-decision powers of the EU, especially following the Lisbon Treaty, have also 
made it an increasingly important arena for interest intermediation and lobbying.
Such increasing opening to interest intermediation also has a downside, however. There is always 
the danger that unequal access could undermine the throughput legitimacy built in the Commission 
consultation processes by becoming “a paradise for lobbyists” as outgoing Danish Commissioner of 
Agriculture Mariann Fischer Boel complained with regard to the EP’s new co-decision powers in the 
agricultural sector (New York Times, 1 February 2010). Moreover, regardless of how open to public 
interest consultation with the people the EU may be, the problem for national citizens is that this kind of 
supranational policymaking is very far from the kind of representative democracy by and of the people 
they tend to see as the most legitimate. And such throughput processes are in any case not open to 
most citizens, given the difficulties of transnational mobilization (see e.g. Guiraudon 2001; Della Porta 
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2009). To remedy this, national governments would need to find ways of encouraging citizen involvement 
in supranational decision-making by helping them to organize themselves transnationally so as to gain 
access and influence in European decision-making – providing funding, information and strategic advice. 
Social movements, moreover, could also do more on their own to try to get their message through to 
Brussels through transnational organization and representation (Della Porta 2009), rather than spending 
so much of their time and energy organizing “no” votes in treaty referenda. But national governments 
would need also to improve the national level inputs by bringing civil society into national formulation 
processes focused on EU decision-making.
Importantly, however, stakeholder democracy, even if improved, is not necessarily public interest oriented 
democracy. And however much the EU and national governments seek to promote “policy with pluralist 
politics” to enhance throughput legitimacy, this cannot be a substitute for input legitimacy, although it can 
be a supplement to it as well as a way of ensuring better output legitimacy. 
5.2  Institutional Rules-Based Throughput
Another problem for throughput legitimacy lies in the processes of decision-making themselves. The 
Lisbon Treaty was touted as the remedy to the institutional decision-making problems of the EU, as all 
three institutional actors – Commission, Council and EP – had their powers enhanced. But big legitimacy 
problems remain with the EU’s institutional rules, in particular the fact that once decisions are made, they 
are nearly impossible to overturn by the member states in the Council; the EU’s transparency, given that 
the Commission-based drive toward greater access to the massive volume of EU-generated information 
on EU decisions perversely may make it less transparent; and the EU’s accountability, given Council rules 
on the secrecy of meetings. There are also problems with regard to the EP’s role, since it has little influence 
over initiation, no connection to comitology and so far also little connection to national parliaments – 
although this could change for the better, given that a procedure for consultation was written into the 
Lisbon Treaty. Finally, and arguably most problematic for throughput, are the unanimity rule for treaties 
and the uniformity ideal for further integration.
The continued use of the unanimity rule for treaties, in which the ability of any member-state to veto any 
agreement can lead to treaty delays, dilution or deadlock, means that even incremental change in an ever-
enlarging Union may be stymied in the future – to the detriment not only of throughput legitimacy but also 
output, since new policies will not be agreed, and input, since a couple of veto-imposing member states 
can frustrate the desires of the large majority (Schmidt 2009a: 26-8). The failure of the Constitutional 
Treaty following the French and Dutch referenda, along with the myriad delays on the Lisbon Treaty, not 
only the Irish referenda but also the last minute horse-trading by the Czech President, are object lessons 
for why the EU needs another way of reaching binding agreements for the member states. The EU would 
do better, for institutional rules-based throughput legitimacy, to do away with the unanimity rule and 
replace it instead with supermajorities (whether two-thirds, four-fifths or even more)6 plus opt-outs 
6 This idea was first suggested by former head of legal services for the Council, Jean-Claude Piris (1995:258-9), 
when he talked of a “very strong majority” and most recently taken up by former Competition Commissioner 
Mario Monti (2009) who proposed numerical supermajorities.
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agreed, say, by Council vote (see Scharpf 2009), and so long as the opt-out does not negatively affect the 
functioning of the proposed political community (e.g. as in fiscal harmonization, where an opt-out might 
vitiate its very purpose) (Schmidt 2009a). In the interim, however, the member states have other ways 
around this, such as through the enhanced cooperation mechanism of the Lisbon Treaty, in which nine 
or more member states can move forward in areas in which agreements have proven difficult to reach, 
the first instance of which, the choice of venue for divorce, is in process for twelve member states after 
much delay.7 Another way is through multiple bilateral (intergovernmental) agreements, as with the new 
financial loan guarantee instrument created in the attempt to stop the contagion effect of the Greek on 
other Southern Mediterranean countries.
The other major problem for the EU is the uniformity ideal, in which EU institutional players resist the 
very idea of differentiated integration, for fear that this will unleash centripetal forces that will pull the 
EU apart, or at the very least undermine an already diffuse sense of solidarity. What they fail to recognize 
is that maintaining uniformity is to the detriment not only of deeper integration but also of any form of 
enlargement through graduated membership (Schmidt 2009a: 28-32). The danger with the uniformity 
ideal is that the EU cannot move forward in those policy areas in which member-state divergence makes 
it unlikely for agreement any time soon, such as in social and tax policies, or that it will seek to impose 
uniformity even where this causes substantial output legitimacy problems, as in the recent European 
Court of Justice court cases noted above. With regard to enlargement, the worry is that the EU will lose its 
democratizing “power of attraction” (Leonard 2005) as neighboring countries that aspire to membership 
get tired of knocking on the door, waiting to be let “in” or told that they are “out” even as they attempt to 
comply with an ever growing number of policy requirements over which they have no voice let alone vote 
(which as such is an affront to input legitimacy).
The uniformity ideal, however, is just that, an ideal – and thus an interactive construction – since the 
institutional reality is already one of a high degree of differentiated integration, given opt-outs in a wide 
range of EU policy communities beyond the Single Market, such as the Eurozone, Schengen, Common 
Security and Defence Policy (CSDP), and the Charter of Fundamental Rights; the presence of “outside 
insiders” like Norway, Iceland and Switzerland; and the increasing integration of prospective and non-
prospective members into EU policy communities, without institutional voice or vote, such as Turkey or 
the Eastern Partnership countries. In giving up the uniformity ideal, the EU could have a future of more 
differentiated integration via informally agreed, exceptional treaty opt-outs as well as through enhanced 
cooperation in a wide range of domains – not just in defense and security through “permanent structured 
cooperation” (Howorth 2009) but also, say, with differentiated immigration zones for East European, 
Nordic and Southern Mediterranean member states; health care pools among member states with cross-
border health care shopping or even fiscal harmonization in Eurozone countries. In addition, the EU could 
retain its power of attraction if it were to offer “graduated membership” for potential candidate members, 
allowing them voice and vote in the policy communities in which they participate – once certain key 
requirements are fulfilled, including democratic practice, respect for human rights, and a commitment 
7 The initial proposal was by nine member states, under the Nice Treaty. It was at first delayed, then moved 
forward again after the Lisbon Treaty rules, but one (Greece) dropped out while three more came on board 
(Germany, Belgium and Latvia). The eight remaining are Austria, Bulgaria, France, Hungary, Italy, Luxembourg, 
Romania, Slovakia and Spain.
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to free markets – thereby guaranteeing more input legitimacy (Schmidt, 2009a: 28-32). This is important 
not only for the EU to continue to be a democratizing and socializing force in its neighborhood but also 
to ensure that the policy decisions are thereby the most legitimate (in input terms) and most effective (in 
output terms) – not only for countries on the periphery but also for countries like Norway and Switzerland, 
which have a major national democratic deficit as a result of the lack of institutional engagement.
5.3  Constructive Deliberative Throughput
Throughput legitimacy requires not just more accountable, transparent and accessible processes that 
also get beyond the unanimity and uniformity traps. It additionally requires more productive deliberative 
interrelationships among actors in the throughput processes of the “coordinative” policy sphere. And 
it can be evaluated in terms of all of the governance processes of the EU – not only in the countless 
discussions, debates and contestations in formal EU processes but also in the more ad hoc and informal 
processes.
With regard to the constructive throughput legitimization of the formal processes of EU interactive 
construction, we could start with Habermas’ (1996) focus on the quality of the deliberative procedures 
as a “counter-steering mechanism” ensuring that citizens’ community power is adequately channeled 
in societal and administrative decision-making, thereby improving accountability (see Bekkers/Edwards 
2007:53). More empirical examples have been elaborated for the Commission-led, consensus-focused 
intermediation with experts in comitology and public interest groups, described as a form of “supranational 
deliberative democracy” (Joerges/Neyer 1999) or “directly-deliberative polyarchy” (Gerstenberg/Sabel 
2000). One might add here the “strong publics” of the European Parliament with the debates contributing 
to the greater accountability and transparency of the decision-making process, although one could also 
see this as contributing to input legitimacy, through the representative nature of MEPs (see Eriksen/
Fossum 2002).
More ad hoc processes of throughput legitimization include the Constitutional Convention. The 
constitutional debates were arguably the first (and only) creation of an EU deliberative public sphere of 
communication in which ideas about how to democratize the EU flowed freely, at least at first, in contrast to 
the Intergovernmental Conference that followed, which went back to the same-old closed door bargaining 
routine (Zürn 2001; Risse 2000; Magnette 2004; Maurer 2003; Eriksen/Fossum 2004; Risse/Kleine 2007). 
The Bologna process by which most European countries both within and outside the EU harmonized 
their higher education degree requirements and trajectories is another example of ad hoc deliberative 
processes, with the EU Commission serving as an institutional facilitator for ideas generated, deliberated 
and institutionalized outside the EU institutional framework (Ravinet 2007). Other informal processes of 
discursive interaction contribute to throughput legitimacy “from below” and include the role of social 
movements (Eder/Trenz 2007: 171-2), as in the case of the European Social Forum (ESF), which improved 
the deliberative quality of communication among its own grassroots activists in European assemblies in 
ways that also contributed to output legitimacy by increasing these social activists’ identification with 
Europe despite their continuing suspicion of the EU’s overly neo-liberal policies (Doerr 2009).
All this may make it appear that constructive throughput legitimacy is assured. But serious problems 
                                 Democracy and Legitimacy in the European Union Revisited    | 25
remain here, too. Generally speaking, the Commission has consciously sought to depoliticize EU policy 
by presenting its initiatives in neutral or “reasonable” language and by using communications techniques 
such as its “Plan D” for democracy (Barbier 2008: 231-2). National leaders, moreover, have been perfectly 
happy with the depoliticized language of EU level “policy without politics” because this leaves them free 
in their national capitals to put any kind of political “spin” of the left, right or centre on EU policies. Add 
this to the fact that their discourse about Europe tends to be blame-shifting or credit-taking on policy 
issues, with silence on the polity issues and it should come as no surprise that the lack of throughput 
political deliberation added to the lack of any overall output legitimizing narrative or direct citizen 
communicative input should lead to institutional input disasters such as failed referenda and rising 
Euroskeptic nationalism.
4. Conclusion: Input, Output and Throughout as Democratic Trilemma or            
 Virtuous Circle?
The problems for legitimacy are not only structural and path dependent, in the way the EU was and is 
institutionally organized, split between national and EU levels. Nor are they mainly the result of the logic 
of rationalist interaction within the existing incentive structures. They are also ideational and discursive, 
as leaders fail to legitimate and citizens fail to deliberate. How citizens think and talk about the EU and its 
institutions, that is, their identities, values and discourse, is as important for the democratic construction 
of legitimacy as are the democratic practices that infuse the institutions with legitimacy. Moreover, the 
problems of European democratic legitimacy are not confined to the EU level but are arguably as serious 
if not more so for the EU’s member states. And only by reinforcing democracy at the national level as well 
as by improving national citizens’ access to EU decision-making through input and throughput processes 
can we be sure to shore up legitimacy at the EU level, in input, output and throughput.
It is important to recognize, however, that any attempts to improve democracy through any one legitimizing 
mechanism may have interaction effects on the other two, as well as on the legitimizing mechanisms of 
national democracies. These interactions can be portrayed as a democratic trilemma involving a zero-sum 
game, in which increasing any one mechanism decreases the other two. However, it could instead be seen 
as a virtuous circle, with the increase in any one as possibly invigorating either one or both of the other 
mechanisms.
For example, the democratic trilemma with regard to input legitimacy suggests that increasing representative 
input at the EU level could be deleterious to the EU’s regulatory output, since this would politicize decisions 
that were efficiently dealt with as technocratic in the past, and to the EU’s pluralist throughput, by reducing 
the influence of minority interests not effectively represented through majoritarian institutions. Not to 
increase institutional input, however, fails to respond to the increasing dissatisfaction of citizens with 
regulatory outputs and their distrust of EU pluralist and rules-based throughputs, for which no amount 
of EU narrative outputs or deliberative throughputs can make up. To promote the creation of a virtuous 
circle, one might instead politicize carefully, say, by moving to more partisan politics with primaries for 
candidates for Commission President as leaders of the largest left or right parliamentary party groupings, 
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and then forming German-like grand coalitions. The resulting increase in representative and deliberative 
input might lead citizens to be more accepting of the EU’s pluralist throughput and regulatory output 
– so long, of course, as these are now genuinely more in the shadow of EU politics. But this, in turn, 
assumes adjustments in output policies – to become more attuned to substantive legitimacy issues – and 
throughput rules – so that unanimity and uniformity do not thwart representative input.
The democratic trilemma with regard to output legitimacy is even more complicated, as is any solution. 
Here, just maintaining let alone increasing regulatory output can be problematic when EU policies clash 
with deeply legitimate national social practices and values, while more constructive output debate about 
such policies may only serve to delegitimate them even further in the eyes of the most affected citizens. 
And this necessarily undermines any kind of constructive output identity-building along with diffuse citizen 
input support, especially in the absence of any attempt at legitimizing narrative output by national leaders. 
More generally, any increase in the output of non-majoritarian institutions also necessarily reduces the 
space for input from majoritarian institutions and deliberations and throughput via minority access and 
deliberation. The only way out of this aspect of the trilemma toward a more virtuous circle is not just 
more and better output discourse and narratives as well as greater representative input to lengthen the 
“shadow of politics” but also remedies involving throughput, to change the institutional rules that put 
regulatory output beyond the reach of representative and deliberative input or pluralist and deliberative 
throughput.
Finally, the democratic trilemma also affects throughput. If one increases pluralist throughput, this could 
effectively decrease not just the EU’s output effectiveness and its input representativeness but even 
their throughput accountability. And yet, if one does not increase access to minority interests in this 
transnational democracy of over 500 million citizens, majoritarian representative input is certainly not 
to be perceived as legitimate by large numbers of citizens. This is not only because their interests are 
not reflected in that majority but also because the EU as a whole lacks the output-built, input-required 
community identity that ensures that majority outcomes are seen as legitimate. Increasing pluralist 
throughput could therefore improve output acceptance at the same time that reforming the unanimity 
and uniformity rules might help with input as well, by enabling the majority demands to work their way 
through the process. Better rules-based throughput, however, whether by way of greater transparency 
and accountability or even an end to the unanimity rule and uniformity ideal, is not likely to mobilize 
citizens or to build the identity and community necessary for diffuse citizen support. All it can do is not 
demobilize citizens, by avoiding corruption scandals or by facilitating decision-making. Only by increasing 
representative and deliberative input and/or improving regulatory and discursive output more positive 
citizen mobilization and identification is likely to occur.
Any recommendations for the reform of the EU have to face up to the democratic trilemma. To turn the 
democratic trilemma into a virtuous circle demands both leadership and imagination, with innovative 
institutional reform ideas along with persuasive discourse and deliberative interactions. What is clear is 
that the problems the EU faces with regard to democratic legitimacy are such that it cannot stand still – 
either it tries to do more to create win-win solutions across output, input and throughput practices and 
constructions or the interaction among legitimacy mechanisms will become increasingly a zero-sum game 
with a downward spiral for the EU’s legitimacy. 
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